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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this research is to analyze the effect of family ownership 
on capital structure with independent commissioner as a moderating 
variable in family companies in Indonesia. The study used the population 
consisting of  family businesses listed on Indonesia Stock Exchange. The 
data were taken from  the Indonesian Capital Market Directory (ICMD), 
financial statements, and annual report and the observation period was 
done from 2012 to 2018. The sampe was taken by  a purposive sampling 
based  the specified criteria. Based on the analysis result, it can be 
concluded that family ownership has a significant negative effect on capital 
structure. Independent commissionerweakens significantly the negative 
effect of family ownership on capital structure. Furthermore,firm sizehas 
a significant positive effect on capital structure, but profitability has a 
significant negative effect on capital structure.
ABSTRAK
Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk menganalisis pengaruh kepemilikan keluarga 
terhadap struktur modal dengan dimoderasi oleh variabel komisaris independen pada 
perusahaan keluarga di Indonesia. Populasi yang digunakan adalah usaha keluarga 
yang terdaftar di Bursa Efek Indonesia. Data diambil dari Indonesian Capital 
Market Directory (ICMD), laporan keuangan, dan laporan tahunan dan periode 
observasi dilakukan dari tahun 2012 hingga 2018. Pengambilan sampel dilakukan 
secara purposive sampling berdasarkan kriteria yang ditentukan.. Berdasarkan 
hasil analisis menunjukkan bahwa kepemilikan keluarga memiliki pengaruh negatif 
signifikan terhadap struktur modal. Komisarisaris independensecara signifikan 
memperlemahpengaruh negatif kepemilikan keluarga terhadap struktur modal. 
Selanjutnya, ukuran perusahaan berpengaruh positif signifikan terhadap struktur 
modal, namun profitabilitas berpengaruh negatif signifikan terhadap struktur 
modal.
1. INTRODUCTION
One  of the businesses which is very common 
in many countries is family business. 
Historically and sociologically, companies in 
Indonesia are family owned and controlled-
company. Although family companies have 
become public companies, their control is still 
held by the family. In Indonesia, the number 
of majority shares owned by the founder 
or founding family is varied, ranging from 
4.48% to 96.64% (Wijayanti, 2014). Besides 
that, these companies, in general, are active 
family companies because the family is not 
only the majority shareholder but also serves 
as the company’s board of directors. About 
67% of companies registered in Indonesia are 
controlled by families (Claessens, Djankov, 
and Lang, 2000). In addition, based on a 
survey conducted by PricewaterhouseCoopers 
(PwC) in 2014 that 87% of family companies 
in Indonesia are active family companies 
where the role of the family is not only as a 
shareholder but also in management.
Family companies in Indonesia contribute 
to around 40% of market capitalization and 
have a considerable effect in key industries such 
as consumer goods, property, and agriculture. 
Research by the Boston Consulting Group 
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shows that Indonesian family businesses that 
can survive in the first generation are only 
around 30% and around 9% can be passed on 
to the third generation. This can indicate that 
many family businesses in Indonesia are still in 
a growth phase. Besides that the  prospects in 
family businesses have significant uncertainties 
so that making decisions taken by family 
companies in Indonesia so that companies can 
continue to survive is interesting to study. 
Constraints in achieving company goals 
are triggered by differences between majority 
and minority shareholder’sinterests which 
will eventually lead to agency problems and 
have an impact on the company’s performance 
as explained by agency theory type II. The 
problem that arises in family businesses is 
agency problem type II because there is a 
conflict between the majority shareholders 
(family) and minority shareholders (non-
family). Family shareholders will try to 
maximize the company’s value and prioritize 
their personal interests rather than the 
minority shareholders’ interests. They also 
minimize the risks faced by the company so 
that the company can be passed on to the next 
generation. Yet, the non-family shareholders 
need to obtain dividends or capital gains so 
that they can lead to prosperity and wealth of 
minority shareholders. Also, previous research 
shows when cash flow rights is lower than 
their family control, family shareholders have 
a strong incentive to expropriate the wealth 
of minority shareholders (Faccio, Lang, and 
Young, 2001).
Strategic decisions like external financing 
can be influenced by sound corporate principles 
as such decisions are taken at the board level 
(Wasim, 2016). Capital structue is one of the 
most important decisions that must be taken 
by company management. It shows how much 
debt is used to fund the company’s assets. In 
the family business, this decision is affected by 
family control in the business.
The difference between the majority 
(family) and minority shareholder’s interests 
will be more prominent in the family company. 
The founders and their families have an 
incentive to influence financing policy as 
they wish. In this context, two motivations 
for influencing capital structure decisions 
are excessive risk avoidance and control 
considerations (Schmid, 2013).
The literature shows that strong and 
non-diversified ownership such as family 
ownership can create more cash available in 
family firms. This can result in companies less 
dependent on the use of debt for financing 
(Jensen, 1986). Shleifer and Vishny (1986) also 
found that family firms will look for sources of 
funds with a low probability of default because 
the owners and managers do not want to use 
funding with high risk. This imples there is a 
greater dependence on their own capital than 
on the use of debt in the capital structure they. 
Faccio et al., (2001) also provided  evidence that 
family firms use lower debt to reduce fixed 
commitments to their cash flows.
The independent commissioner in a 
family company plays an important role 
in reducing agency problems between 
family and non-family shareholders. This is 
because, according to UUPT, the independent 
commissioner has the aim to create  a more 
objective climate and to place equality (justice) 
among various interests including corporate 
interests and the interests of stakeholders. The 
presence of independent commissioners has an 
important effect on board effectiveness because 
independence is assumed to be closely related 
to the strength of the board of commissioners. 
In this case, the independent commissioners 
have greater objectivity and independence in 
their analysis of management and company 
behavior (Uribe-bohorquez, Martínez-ferrero 
and García-sánchez, 2018). In governance in 
family companies, independent commissioner 
can influence the board to choose a higher 
dividend payment policy and/or to adopt a 
higher level of debt to have better corporate 
governance (Atmaja, 2010).
Based on the results of the above 
phenomena and problem formulation, 
the purpose of this research is to develop 
the previous research and to test as well 
as to examine the role of the independent 
commissioner in the effect of family ownership 
on capital structure in the family business in 
Indonesia.
2. THEORITICAL FRAMEWORK AND 
HYPOTHESIS
Definition of Capital Structure
The capital structure reflects the use of long-
term debt to fund its assets. Sudana (2011: 143), 
states that capital structure is a comparison 
between  long-term debt and equity. Besides 
that the capital structure is related to long-term 
funding decisions to be taken by the company. 
This can be referred to Margaretha (2014: 
305), who states that the capital structure is a 
permanent financing company that consists of 
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long-term debt and equity capital. According to 
Sjahrial (2014: 250), capital structure is a balance 
between the use of loan capital consisting of 
short-term debt that is permanent, long-term 
debt, and own capital consisting of preferred 
shares and common shares.
Definition of Family Ownership
Family ownership is total shares held by 
family compared to total outstanding shares. 
Anderson and Reeb(2003), Faccio and 
Lang(2002), La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and 
Shleifer(1999) define family ownership as part 
of the shares owned by the family in a company. 
Pukthuanthong, Walker, Thiengtham, and 
Du (2013) also define family ownership as 
a portion of shares owned by a founder or 
founding family in a company.
From some of the notions above, it can 
be concluded that family ownership is the 
proportion of shares held by family members 
in the company both individually and through 
family institutions of the total outstanding 
shares. Family relationships are identified by 
tracking the founder’s family share ownership 
directly or indirectly by being identified 
with the same clan name or last name as the 
company founder.
Definition of Independent Commissioner
Independent commissioners are members 
of the board of commissioners. In addition, 
independent commissioners are free from 
business relationships or other relationships 
that can affect their ability to act independently. 
According to Financial Services Authority 
Regulation No. 57 of 2017— concerning the 
Implementation of Governance of Securities 
Companies Conducting Business Activities 
as Underwriters and Brokers—independent 
commissioners are members of the board 
of commissioners originating from outside 
the company and fulfill the requirements as 
independent commissioners as referred to in 
the Authority Regulations Financial Services. 
When the board of commissioners consists of 
more than two people, the percentage of the 
number of independent commissioners must 
be at least 30% (thirty percent) of the total 
members of the board of commissioners.
Effect of Family Ownership on Capital Struc-
ture
According to pecking order theory, companies 
tend to adopt hierarchical financing sequences: 
first, they use internal resources and then 
external financing. If external financing 
is needed, they prefer debt over equity. 
This happens because there is information 
asymmetry between managers and potential 
investors, which limits access to external 
financing.The same reason is also found in 
family companies, which tend to use more 
internal resources, because of the greater 
potential for expropriation, and external 
financial costs are more sensitive to unclear 
information (Chen, Dasgupta, and Yu, 2014; 
Ma and Tian, 2017).
Family companies have large and 
concentrated shareholder characteristics, 
Jensen (1986) shows that strong and non-
diversified ownership can result in more free 
cash flow available in the family company, 
which make the company more dependent 
on the company’s internal funding. The 
characteristics of a family company where 
managers are often the owners also, make them 
have greater ability to modify the company’s 
portfolio of assets to use benefits and provide 
funds for themselves, and the family (Ramalho 
and Da Silva, 2009; Roger and Schatt, 2016).
Therefore, in order to continue to benefit itself, 
funding decisions taken by family companies 
are driven by a desire to avoid monitoring 
inherent in the use of external funds (Koropp, 
Kellermanns, Grichnik and Stanley, 2014).
Faccio et al.(2001)also show that family firms 
have lower debt levels that are used to reduce 
fixed commitments in the form of interest in 
their cash flows.
Family shareholders are usually less 
diversified investors (Anderson and Reeb, 
2003). Therefore, they face a high risk of 
one single asset, that is, a family company. 
Therefore, families have incentives to reduce 
risk at the company level(Schmid, 2013).
The use of large debt will increase the risk of 
bankruptcy faced by the company because 
debt has a fixed cost of interest, and debt has 
a relatively long bond, so it has a high enough 
risk. Therefore, families will use more internal 
funding sources that have low risks such as 
retained earnings to fund company assets. 
Therefore,  the hypothesis in this study isstated 
as follows:
H1: Family ownership has a negative effect on 
capital structure.
The role of the independent commissioneron 
the effect of family ownership on capital 
structure
In resolving agency problems (agency conflicts 
between principals and agents), among other 
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things, they can do it together with supervisors 
from outside the company. These advisors have 
absolutely nothing to do with the company, 
for example with the presence of independent 
commissioners (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).
Improving the independent commissioner 
helps to resolve the effective monitoring 
function of the board towards the management 
of the company (Purag and Bujang, 2016). 
Independent commissioners play an important 
role in monitoring the executive. Due to the 
effective monitoring, the board tends to align 
their interests with the interests of shareholders 
and, as such, can use more debt in their capital 
structure (Tarus and Ayabei, 2015). This is 
consistent with agency theory, a board with a 
large number of independent commissioners 
can limit the implementation of managerial 
policies. This can exploit the wealth of minority 
shareholders. Independent commissioners help 
to resolve disagreements between managers 
and residual claimants. A board consisting of 
independent commissioners will provide a 
balance so insiders do not take advantage of 
their position and shareholder wealth(Badu 
and Appiah, 2017).
Similarly, referring to the resource 
dependency theory, companies with large 
independent commissioners are more likely 
use higher leverage because they have access 
and ability to connect companies with debt 
capital providers. Thus, the hypothesis can be 
stated as the following.
H2: Independent commissioner weakens the 
negative effect of family ownership on capital 
structure
Framework
Based on the relationship between variables that 
have been stated, a framework can be drawn 
in relation to  the effect of family ownership 
on capital structure with moderating variable 
toward the in-dependent commissionerin 
family business in In-donesia. The framework 
is shown in Figure 1.
3. RESEARCH METHOD
The population consists of family businesses 
listed on Indonesia Stock Exchange. The data is 
obtained from the Indonesian Capital Market 
Directory (ICMD), financial statements, and 
annual report. The observation period is from 
2012 to 2018. The method used for sampling 
technique is a purposive sampling that is 
the sample selection technique by using the 
specified criteria. A seven-year study 
period is chosen because it describes the 
relatively new condition in the family business 
in Indonesia, so, it is expected that the result 
of this research will be more relevant to 
understand the actual conditions in Indonesia. 
The companies that become the samples 
are companies chosen based on purposive 
sampling
The method to attain representative 
samples is in accordance with the specified 
criteria. The sample criteria that will be used 
are as follows:
Companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Ex-
change
The company published annual financial 
statements that end on December 31 in 2012-
Figure 1
Research Framework
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2018. The financial statements are presented 
in rupiah The company is a non-financial 
company. The company is a family company.
Moderation variables commonly can be 
classified into 2 types, namely pure moderation, 
and quasi moderation, In brief, the 2 types of 
classification of moderation variables can be 
explained as follows:
Pure moderation 
Pure moderation is a variable that moderates 
the relationship between independent 
variables and the dependent variable in which 
pure moderation variables interact with 
independent variables without becoming an 
independent variable.Pure moderation occurs 
when the moderation coefficient is declared 
insignificant but the interaction coefficient is 
statistically significant.
Quasi moderation
Quasi moderation is a variable that moderates 
the relationship between the independent 
variable and the dependent variable in which 
the quasi moderation variable interacts with 
the independent variable as well as being an 
independent variable.Quasi moderation occurs 
when the moderation coefficient and interaction 
coefficient are statistically significant.
Research Data 
The data used were  secondary data,taken from 
the annual and financial report for the period 
of 2012-2018. This study used a quantitative 
approach by conducting a hypothesis test. 
The sources of data were collected from 
Indonesian Capital Market Directory (ICMD), 
financial statements, and annual reports 
obtained from the official website of Indonesia 
Stock Exchange, www.idx.co.id. The data are 
collected, selected, and taken as the samples 
and processed in the study.
Research Variables
The dependent variable in this study is the 
capital structure measured by the book value 
debt ratio and the market value debt ratio, and 
the independent variable in this study is family 
ownership. This study usesa moderating 
variable namely,independent commissioner.
Operational Definition and Variable Meas-
urement
Measurement of capital structure
The capital structure was measured by two 
measurements, namely the book value of debt 
ratio (BOOKDEBT) and the market value debt 
ratio (MARKETDEBT) based on Baek, Cho, 
and Fazio(2016) researchwith the following 
formula:
BOOKDEBT= Long Term Debt / Book Value 
of  Total Asset
MARKETDEBT= Long Term Debt / Long 
Term Debt + Market Value of 
BOOKDEBT
The book value debt ratio measures the 
proportion of funds sourced from long-term 
debt to finance company assets. This ratio is 
past-oriented because the data used to measure 
is historical data derived from the company’s 
financial statements. The greater this ratio will 
show the portion of the use of long-term debt in 
financing investment in assets is greater, while 
the market value of the debt ratio measures 
the value of debt to the market value of the 
company. This ratio is future-oriented because 
it uses a market value in its measurement. 
The greater this ratio shows that the higher 
the value of debt to the market value of the 
company.
Measurement of family ownership
Family ownership (FAMOWN) in this study 
was measured bytotal shares held by family 
(FAMSHARES) compared to total outstanding 
shares (TSHARES), based on Baek, Cho 
and Fazio(2016) research with the following 
formula:
FAMOWN = FAMSHARES / TSHARES
The greater this ratio reflects the greater 
the family control in the company and also the 
higher the family participation in company 
management.
Measurement of independent commissioner
The independent commissioner (INDEPCOM) 
was measured through the proportion of 
independent commissioners in management 
to the number of commissioners based on 
Atmaja(2010), as measured by:
INDEPCOM= Number of Independent commi-
ssioner / Total Commissioner
The greater this ratio reflects that 
the greater the oversight of independent 
commissionerin the company.
Control Variables
Several factors expected to influence capital 
structure decisions.According toFrank and 
Goyal(2009), factors that influence capital 
structure arefirm size, tangibility, and 
profitability. 
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Firm size (SIZE) is measured by the 
natural logarithm of assets, firms that are 
large (in terms of assets) tend to have higher 
leverage because large, more diversified, firms 
face lower default risk. In addition, older firms 
with better reputations in debt markets face 
lower debt-related agency costs. Thus,more 
mature firms to have relatively more debt. 
Tangibility (TANG) was measured by 
the ratio of plant, property, and equipment 
to total asset, firms that have more tangible 
assets tend to have higher leverage.The higher 
tangible assets ratio provides a greater level 
of security for creditors, due to collateral for 
loans provided by creditors so that in the event 
of bankruptcy the creditor can liquidate the 
assets guaranteed by the company to meet its 
obligations.The higher collateralwas given 
to creditors, the greater the opportunity the 
company has to get a bigger debt because the 
company is considered capable of paying off 
its loans.
Profitability (ROA) is measured by 
the ratio of net income to total assets, firms 
that have more profits tend to have lower 
leverage.Profitable firms face lower expected 
costs of financial distress and find interest tax 
shieldsmore valuable. Thus, the tax and the 
bankruptcy costs perspective predicts that 
profitable firms use more debt.
4. DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
Descriptive Statistics
The descriptive statistic of this study illustrates 
the minimum, maximum, and mean value of 
the variables used in family companies listed 
on the Indonesia Stock Exchange in 2012 to 
2018 are shown in Table 1.
The dependent variable is the capital 
structure while the independent variable 
in this study is family ownership. And the 
control variables are the size of the company, 
profitability, and tangible assets, and the 
moderating variable in this study is the 
independent commissioner.
Table 1, shows that the capital structure as 
measured by the book value debt ratio and the 
market value debt ratio of family companies in 
Indonesia in the period 2012 to 2018 showed an 
average of 0.1903 and 0.2448. The lowest values 
for these variables are 0.0022 and 0.0030, while 
the highest values  are 0.5864 and 0.8330. This 
figure shows that companies use more funding 
than debt to fund their assets.
The family ownership variable shows an 
average of 0.5774. The lowest value for the 
family ownership variable is 0.0439, while 
the maximum value for the family ownership 
variable is 0.9720. This figure shows that 
the majority shareholders of non-financial 
companies in Indonesia during the observation 
Table 1
Descriptive Statistic
Variable N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation
BOOKDEBT 169 0.0022 0.5864 0.1903 0.1208
MARKETDEBT 169 0.0030 0.8330 0.2448 0.2275
FAMOWN 169 0.0439 0.9720 0.5774 0.1706
INDEPCOM 169 0.0151 0.8000 0.3996 0.1139
FAMOWN* INDEPCOM 169 0.0007 0.5529 0.2334 0.0964
SIZE 169 11.4376 13.9442 12.7698 0.4695
TANG 169 0.0002 0.9753 0.2913 0.2083
ROA 169 -0.1539 0.3340 0.0776 0.0791
Valid N (listwise) 169
Source: SPSS Output Data 
Table 2
Normality Test
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period were shareholders who came from 
families.
The independent commissionervariable 
shows an average of 0.3996. The lowest value 
for the variable is 0.0151, while the maximum 
value for the variable family ownership is 
0.8000. This figure shows that almost all 
companies have independent commissioners 
because they are under regulations set by the 
Financial Services Authority in Indonesia.
The following classical test assumptions 
are performed to determine whether there are 
problems with the regression model.
Normality Test
Based on the Kolmogorov-Smirnov normality 
test in table 2 shows that Assymp. Sig (2-tailed) 
of 0.052 and 0.056. This shows that the residual 
value in the regression equation is normally 
distributed because of the Assymp value. Sig. 
(2-tailed) is greater than 0.05.
Multicollinearity Test
Multicollinearity test was doen to analyze 
whether in themodel of regression there is a 
relationship between independent variables. 
The tool used to conduct a multicollinearity 
test is the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF). If 
the VIF value is < 10 or 0.1, this means that 
multicollinearity does not occur. However, 
if the VIF value is > 10, the data variable 
experiences multicollinearity (Ghozali, 2016b: 
103). Multicollinearity test results can be seen 
in Table 2
Based on Table 3, the results of testing 
in both models of this study indicate that 
tolerance values > 0.10 and VIF <10 except the 
interaction variables between family ownership 
and independent commissioner,. It can be seen 
that there is no multicollinearity between the 
independent variables in the regression model.
Autocorrelation Test
Autocorrelation test serves to test whether 
there is a relationship between confounding 
errors in the period of this study and those in 
previous studies. The tool used in this test is 
durbin watson. The results are presented in 
Table 4.
Based on the spss output in the table 
above, the d-w value is obtained when there is 
no autocorrelation. According to gujarati and 
porter (2009:436), the regression test did not 
experience autocorrelation if the d-w value was 
between du and 4-du. Based on the results of the 
autocorrelation test it can be concluded that in 
this research model there is no autocorrelation.
Heteroskedasticity test
Heteroscedasticity test to describe the case 
where the variance of errors or the model is not 
the same for all observations, while often one 
of the basic assumptions in modeling is that 
the variances are homogeneous and that the 
errors of the model are identically distributed.
heteroscedasticity testing in this study uses the 
glejser test.the glejser test proposes to regress 
a residual absolute value as a dependent 
variable with an independent variable. If the 
independent variable significantly influences 
the absolute residual, then there is an indication 
of heteroscedasticity, on the contrary, if the 
Table 3
Multicolinearity Test
Independent Variable Tolerance VIF Explanation
FAMOWN 0.132 7.572 No Multicollinearity
INDEPCOM 0.196 5.093 No Multicollinearity
FAMOWN*INDEPCOM 0.079 12.730 Multicollinearity
SIZE 0.938 1.066 No Multicollinearity
TANGI 0.939 1.065 No Multicollinearity




Model R R square Adjusted r square Durbin-watson
1 0.665 0.443 0.422 1.155
2 0.710 0.504 0.486 0.949
Source: processed data
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independent variable does not affect the 
absolute residual, then there is no indication of 
heteroscedasticity.
Table 5, shows that all independent 
variables, both in the book debt and market 
debt models are not significant to their absolute 
residuals (sig. Greater than 0.05). Thus, it can 
be concluded that there are no symptoms of 
heteroscedasticity.
Results of Analysis and Discussion
Based on Table 6, the results of the regression 
model analysis show that family ownership 
has a significant negative effect on the two 
measurements of capital structure, namely the 
book and market value debt ratio. This means 
that the higher the family ownership, the lower 
the use of debt in funding company assets. 
This is because family ownership reflects the 
level of family control over the company, 
and family shareholders are generally less 
diversified shareholders, so the risks faced by 
family shareholders are quite large. Therefore, 
to reduce the risk faced by the company, family 
ownership tends to reduce funding by using 






Book Debt Market Debt
Constant -0.019 0.126 0.845
FAMOWN -0.035 -0.072 0.489
INDEPCOM -0.018 0.086 0.769
FAMOWN* INDEPCOM 0.031 0.034 0.792
SIZE 0.008 -0.002 0.318
TANG -0.018 0.034 0.272
ROA -0.061 -0.094 0.164
Source: Processed Data
Table 6
Results of Analysis of the Effect of Family Ownership on Capital Structure with the 
Independent Commissioner as A Moderating Variable
Variable Without Control Variables With Control Variables























































The sign *, **, *** shows significant at α of 10%, 5%, 1%
The numbers in parenthesis is the t-statistic value
Source: spss output data that has been processed
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risk of bankruptcy that the family shareholders 
want to avoid. 
The interaction of family ownership 
and the independent commissioner has a 
significant positive effect on capital structure. 
This shows that independent commissioners 
the negative influence between family 
ownership, which means that the greater 
proportion of independent commissionersin 
the company. This is because the independent 
commissioner can reduce agency problems 
faced by the family company because the 
existence of independent commissioners can 
make the supervision and control of the board 
of managers more effective. These results are 
consistent with atmaja (2010) which shows 
that independent commissioner weakens the 
negative influence between family ownership 
and capital structure.
The size of the company has a significant 
positive effect on the ratio of capital structure. 
This is because the risk of bankruptcy faced by 
large companies is lower when compared to 
smaller companies. Large companies are more 
able to diversify their businesses than small 
companies. In addition, large companies can 
also increase the level of creditor confidence, 
because large companies are considered as 
an indicator of a company that has the good 
financial capability so that the company is 
able to repay its loans. Roa has a significant 
negative effect on the book value debt ratio and 
the market value debt ratio. This means that 
the higher the roa, the lower the use of debt 
in funding company assets.these results are 
consistent with the research of frank and goyal 
(2009) which shows that company size has a 
positive effect on capital structure.meanwhile, 
tangibility does not significantly influence both 
measurements of capital structure.
The coefficient of determination (r2) for 
each book value debt ratio variable and the 
market value debt ratio variable are 0.443 and 
0.504. This shows that 44.3% of the book value 
debt ratio and 50.4% of the market value of the 
debt ratio can be explained by the variables 
studied, while the remaining 55.7% and 49.6% 
are explained by other variables not contained 
in the model.
5. CONCLUSION, IMPLICATION, SUG-
GESTION AND LIMITATION
This study was conducted to analyze the role 
of the independent commissioner in the effect 
of family ownership on capital structure in the 
family business in Indonesia. This research 
was conducted by analyzing family firms in 
Indonesia from 2012-2018. Based on the results 
of the analysis and discussion, the researchers 
rpovide several conclusions. First,family 
ownership has a significant negative effect on 
the capital structure both on the measurement 
of book debt ratio and market debt ratio.
Second,independent commissioner weakens 
significantly the negative effect of family 
ownership on capital structure.It means that 
the negative effect of family ownership on 
the capital structure will be weaker when the 
proportion of independent commissioners is 
higher.Third, firm size has a significant positive 
effect on capital structure, but profitability has 
a significant negative effect on capital structure, 
meanwhile, tangibility has no effect on capital 
structure.
Based on these research results, there are 
several implications. First, theoretically, the 
result showing that family ownership has a 
negative effect on capital structure supports 
the theoretical idea that the higher the family 
ownership, the greater the risk faced by the 
family therefore the company will reduce the 
use of debt to reduce risk. Second, the more 
independent commissioners can increase the 
bravery of family firms to add more debt to 
finance their profitable investment, so the 
family firm can utilize more debt to finance 
their profitable projects with monitoring by 
more independent commissioners.
This study still has some limitations in 
terms of measurement and variable. This 
includes: (1) proxy corporate governance 
mechanism to reduce agency problems using 
only one variable, independent commissioner, 
(2) measurement of family ownership that 
uses only one measurement. Therefore, it 
is suggested that further research: (1) add 
other corporate governance variables, such as 
board size, audit committee and remuneration 
committee, (2) add other measurements in the 
measurement of family ownership, such as the 
use of dummy variables.
REFERENCES
Anderson, R.C. dan Reeb, D.M. (2003). 
Founding family and firm 
performance: evidence from the S&P 
500.Journal of Finance, 58(3), 1301-1328.
Atmaja, L. S. (2010). Dividend and debt policies 
of family controlled firms: The impact 
of board independence. International 
Journal of Managerial Finance, 6(2), 128-
142.
144
Rahmat Setiawan & Nunik Dwi Kusumawati, The effect of family ownership
Badu, E. A. and Appiah, K. O. (2017). The 
effects of board experience and 
independence on mitigating agency 
conflict.Journal of Accounting in 
Emerging Economies, 7(4), 445–467.
Baek, H. Y., Cho, D. D., & Fazio, P. L. (2016). 
Family ownership, control and 
corporate capital structure: An 
examination of small capitalization 
public firms. Journal of Family Business 
Management, 6(2), 169 – 185.
Chen, T., Dasgupta, S. and Yu, Y. (2014). 
Transparency and Financing Choices 
of Family Firms.Journal of Financial 
And Quantitative Analysis, 49(2), 381–
408
Claessens, S., Djankov, S., & Lang, L. H. (2000). 
The separation of ownership and 
control in East Asian corporations. 
Journal of financial Economics, 58(1-2), 
81-112.
Faccio, M., Lang, L. H., & Young, L. (2001). Debt 
and corporate governance. Working 
Paper. In Meetings of Association of 
Financial Economics in New Orleans.
Faccio, M., & Lang, L. H. (2002). The ultimate 
ownership of Western European 
corporations. Journal of financial 
economics, 65(3), 365-395.
Frank, M. dan Goyal. (2009). Capital structure 
decisions: which factors are reliably 
important?.Journal of Financial 
Management, 38(1), 1-37.
Ghozali, I., (2016). Aplikasi Analisis Multivariete 
Dengan Program IBM SPSS 23. 8th 
ed. Semarang: Badan Penerbit 
Universitas Diponegoro
Gujarati, D., & Porter, D. (2009). Basic 
Econometric. 5th Edition. McGraw –
Hill: New York.
Jensen, C. and Meckling, H. (1976). Theory 
Of The Firm : Managerial Behavior 
, Agency Costs And Ownership 
Structure.Journal of Financial 
Economics, 3(4), 305–360.
Jensen, M.C. (1986). Agency costs of free 
cash flow, corporate finance, and 
the market for takeovers.American 
Economic Review, 76(2), 323-329.
Koropp, C., Kellermanns, F. W., Grichnik, 
D., & Stanley, L. (2014). Financial 
decision making in family firms: An 
adaptation of the theory of planned 
behavior. Family Business Review, 
27(4), 307–327.
La Porta, R., Lopez‐de‐Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. 
(1999). Corporate ownership around 
the world. The journal of finance, 54(2), 
471-517.
Ma, L. and Tian, G. G. (2017). Corporate opacity 
and cost of debt for family firms.The 
European Accounting Review, 26(1), 
27–59.
Margaretha, Farah. (2014). Dasar-dasar 
Manajemen Keuangan. Jakarta: Dian 
Rakyat.
Pukthuanthong, K., Walker, T. J., Thiengtham, 
D. N., & Du, H. (2013). Does family 
ownership create or destroy value? 
Evidence from Canada. International 
Journal of Managerial Finance, 9(1), 13-
48.
Purag, M. Bin and Bujang, I. (2016). Corporate 
governance and capital structure of 
Malaysian family-owned companies. 
Journal of Business and Retail 
Management Research, 11(1), 18–30.
Ramalho, J. J. S. and Da Silva, J. V. (2009). A 
two-part fractional regression model 
for the financial leverage decisions of 
micro, small, medium and large firms.
Quantitative Finance, 9(5), 621–636.
Roger, P. and Schatt, A. (2016). Idiosyncratic 
risk, private benefits, and the value 
of family firms.Finance Research 
Letters,17, 235–245.
Schmid, T. (2013). Control Considerations, 
Creditor Monitoring, and The Capital 
Structure of Family Firms.Journal of 
Banking & Finance, 37(2), 257-272.
Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. W. (1986). Large 
Shareholders and Corporate Control. 
Journal of Political Economy,94(3), 
461–488.
Sjahrial, D. (2014). Manajemen Keuangan 
Lanjutan. Edisi Revisi. Jakarta: Mitra 
Wacana Media.
The Indonesian Accounting Review Vol. 10, No. 2, July - December 2020, pages 135 - 145
145
Sudana, I.M. (2011). Manajemen Keuangan 
Perusahaan Teori dan Praktik. Edisi 
pertama. Jakarta: Erlangga.
Tarus, D. K. and Ayabei, E. (2015). Board 
composition and capital structur : 
evidence from Kenya.Management 
Research Review, 39(9), 1056–1079.
Uribe-bohorquez, M., Martínez-ferrero, J., 
& García-sánchez, I. (2018). Board 
independence and firm performance: 
The moderating effect of institutional 
context. Journal of Business Research 
Journal, 88, 28–43.
Wasim, F. (2016). Impact of Corporate 
Governance and Ownership Structure 
on Capital Structure.International 
Journal of Management Sciences and 
Business Research, 5(11), 119–133.
Wijayanti, L. (2014). Pengaruh Kontrol 
Keluarga dan Komisaris Independen 
terhadap Kebijakan Dividen dan 
Struktur Modal Pada Perusahaan 
yang Terdaftar di BEI.Jurnal Ekonomi 
dan Bisnis, 24(1), 81-89.
